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Abstract
We provide evidence on household and market production in 36 countries since 1960. On
average the household sector accounts for almost half of total hours worked. As GDP per
capita increases, the employment share of household production in total hours worked ini-
tially declines and then hardly changes while the employment shares of market goods and
services decrease and increase. Estimating the value added of household production yields
similar patterns. Labor productivity of household production is lower than and positively
correlated with that in the market. These findings can be used as an input into quantitative
work involving household production.
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1 Introduction
The reallocation of production factors across broad market sectors is among the prominent
stylized facts of modern economic growth: as GDP per capita grows, the goods sector shrinks
while the service sector expands. A large literature shows that this structural transformation
is a crucial force behind important economic phenomena.1 Although most of the literature
on structural transformation is about reallocation among market sectors, there is also important
reallocation between the market sectors and the household sector. Recent work has documented
and studied that reallocation in the U.S. and other rich countries.2
What is still missing from the existing literature is systematic evidence on the behavior of
hours, value added, and labor productivity of household production in a large panel of countries
of all levels of development. The contribution of this paper is to provide such evidence in
a form that can be used as an input into quantitative work involving the household sector.3
Achieving this involves a major effort of obtaining and harmonizing the required data from
time use surveys and NIPA. We collect 126 time use surveys from 36 countries during the time
period 1961–2012.4 The 36 countries in our sample cover more than 40% of world population
and more than three quarters of world GDP in 2000. While most of our countries are OECD
members, we also have collected data for low–income countries such as Algeria, Bangladesh,
Colombia, India, and South Africa.
We find that in most countries the household sector is responsible for a sizeable part of
economic activity. On average it accounts for 46% of total hours worked (where total refers to
market plus household). Moreover, the variation in the shares of household hours in total hours
is large in our sample, ranging from around a quarter to about two thirds. We find the following
stylized facts about the behavior of the household sector in comparison with the market sectors.
As GDP per capita increases, the employment share of the household sector initially declines
somewhat and then hardly changes whereas the employment shares of market goods and market
services decrease and increase, respectively. These facts imply that the employment share of
total services increases with GDP per capita (where total services refers to market–produced
plus household–produced services).
Our findings have two implications. First, the main stylized fact of structural transformation
continues to hold for broad sectors: as GDP per capita grows, the goods sector shrinks while
the broad service sector expands. Second, our sample of countries experiences marketization
1Herrendorf et al. (2014) provide a review of the literature. Contributions to it include Echevarria (1997),
Kongsamut et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Rogerson (2008), Herrendorf et al. (2013), Boppart (2014),
Herrendorf et al. (2015), and Duernecker and Herrendorf (2015b).
2Benhabib et al. (1991) started the modern literature on household production. Subsequent contributions in-
clude Greenwood et al. (2005), Rogerson (2008), Ngai and Pissarides (2008), Olovsson (2009), McDaniel (2011),
Ngai and Petrongolo (2013), Ragan (2013), and Duernecker and Herrendorf (2015a).
3Examples include those mentioned in footnote 2.
4All data used for our analysis is available from our websites.
2
of services in that labor is reallocated from the household sector to the market–service sector.
The fact that the employment share of the household sector does not change much with GDP
per capita must mean that the opposing effects of structural transformation and marketization
on the employment of the household sector largely offset each other.
We also calculate the value added of household production for a subsample that still con-
tains 33 countries, which yields similar patterns of structural transformation and marketization
in terms of value added shares, although the variation of value added produced in the house-
hold turns out to be rather large. Since the value added of household production is not traded
in the market, calculating it involves an imputation that follows the methodology underlying
the BEA’s Satellite Account for Household Production. This methodology is based on the in-
come approach of calculating value added, which combines information about the production
factors used in household production with the rental prices for comparable production factors
in the market. Specifically, value added of household production is obtained as the sum of cap-
ital and labor used in household production, each multiplied with an appropriate rental price.
Kendrick (1979), Landefeld et al. (2009) and Bridgman (2013) offer detailed descriptions of
this methodology and Schreyer and Diewert (2014) provide a theoretical justification for it.
Given estimates of the hours worked and the value added of household production, it is
straightforward to estimate the labor productivity of household production as the ratio of the
two. We find that while the labor productivity of household production is positively corre-
lated with the labor productivity of market production, it is typically less than half of that in
the market. Moreover, for countries with similar labor productivities in the market, the differ-
ence in household labor productivities can be sizable. Lastly, in the U.S. the labor productivity
of household production has all but stagnated since 1960, which is similar to what Bridgman
(2013) found. In contrast, in most other countries the labor productivity of household produc-
tion experienced sustained increases, and it often caught up with or even overtook that in the
U.S.
Estimates of the labor productivity of household production are essential when one seeks to
connect models with a household sector to the data. This statement applies both to estimations
like Rupert et al. (1995), Fang and Zhu (2012), and Moro et al. (2015) and to calibrations of
the growth model with household production like Ngai and Pissarides (2008), Rogerson (2008)
and McDaniel (2011). Most of such calibrations deliver what our imputation implies, that is,
household labor productivity stagnates in the U.S. Regarding countries other than the U.S.,
a popular approach is to postulate that the ratio of the labor productivities in the household
relative to the market shows the same behavior as in the U.S.; see for example Rogerson (2008)
or McDaniel (2011). We find that among the countries for which we have long enough time
series only a minority conforms with this pattern. In contrast, most of the countries for which
we have long enough time series are catching up with the high level of labor productivity
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of household production in the U.S., and so their labor productivity of household production
increases considerably more than in the U.S.
The work of Bridgman (2013) is closely related to our work. Bridgman uses a similar im-
putation method as we do to obtain time series estimates for the labor productivity of household
production in the US during the last hundred or so years. In contrast, we focus on a panel of
over thirty countries during the last fifty or so years. The work of Fang and McDaniel (2014),
who document the behavior of household hours in a panel of countries, is also closely related
to our work. In contrast to us, they restrict their attention to Europe and the U.S., and so they
do not cover poor countries. Other differences between their and our work is that we describe
the cross–country differences in household production depending on the level of development,
put them into the context of structural transformation and marketization, and estimate the value
added and the labor productivity, in addition to hours worked, of household production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the facts about
hours worked in the household sector in comparison with the market sectors. Section 3 presents
our findings about the value added and the labor productivity of the household sector. Section
4 discusses the robustness of our imputation of value added produced by the household sector.
Section 5 concludes. We have provided an extensive online appendix to accompany this paper,
available with all the data at our websites.
2 Employment in the Household Sector
2.1 Time use data
Table 1: Sample of countries (number of time use surveys in parenthesis)
Albania (1) Ecuador (1) Japan (8) Russia (9)
Algeria (1) Estonia (2) Korea (7) Slovenia (1)
Australia (4) Finland (4) Macedonia (1) South Africa (2)
Austria (3) France (5) Mexico (2) Spain (2)
Bangladesh (1) Germany (3) Netherlands (7) Sweden (4)
Basque Country (4) Hungary (1) New Zealand (2) Taiwan (3)
Canada (7) India (1) Norway (5) U.K. (7)
Colombia (1) Iraq (2) Panama (1) Uruguay (1)
Denmark (4) Italy (4) Poland (1) U.S. (14)
Probably the most often used statistic for describing the household sector is hours worked
in household production based on high quality time use surveys.5 We collect 126 time–use
5Household production is often also referred to as home production. We prefer the term household production,
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surveys for 36 countries starting in 1960. In 2000, these 36 countries cover more than 40% of
the world population and more than two thirds of world GDP.6 While many time–use surveys
that are an input into our analysis come from the Multinational Time Use Surveys (MTUS;
Gershuny and Fisher (2013)), for twenty countries we have augmented MTUS information
with additional time use surveys that we obtained from national statistical agencies. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to document the behavior of hours worked in the household
for a large sample of 36 rich, middle–income and poor countries. Table 1 lists the countries.
Tables 9–10 in the appendix give the detailed data sources.7
The level of disaggregation differs across the different time use surveys that we have access
to. We aggregate the available information up to the broad categories of activities listed in
Table 2 and define household production time as the sum of the time spent on any of these
activities. This definition essentially follows Ramey (2009). In Section 4 below we will discuss
to robustness of our findings to different definitions.
Table 2: Broad classification of household production activities
Household production activities Examples
Cleaning, household upkeep Dishwashing, bedmaking, sweeping, disposal of garbage
Household management Planning, supervising, paying bills
Construction and repairs Repairs of dwelling, renovation, vehicle maintenance
Food management Food preparation, baking, preserving food
Textiles care Laundry, ironing
Animal care Walking the dog
Gardening Care of plants, harvesting
Childcare Washing, dressing, bathing, feeding, help with homework
Adultcare Physical care, health care, companionship
Shopping Purchase of goods, clothing, private services (bank, post office, ... )
Travel connected to activities above
2.2 The size of the household sector versus the market sector
Figure 1 plots household hours, market hours, and total hour worked against GDP per capita
from the Conference Board.8 The figure also contains the legend used throughout the paper. All
because while it is done outside of the market, household production may also be done outside of the home.
Gardening and travel are examples.
6These shares are calculated from the World Development Indicator in constant ppp–adjusted international
dollars. The WDI does not list information for the Basque Country and Taiwan.
7We have included data from the Basque Country although it is not an independent country. The reason for
doing this is that MTUS has high–quality time use data for the Basque Country, which show rather different
patterns from the Spanish numbers.
8GDP per capita is in 1990 prices and is PPP adjusted. The lines are from locally weighted regressions. We
include these regression lines in all Figures for which we have sufficiently many observations.
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Figure 1: The Size of the Household Sector – Employment Levels
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hours are weekly averages for the working–age population 15–64 years old that we calculate
from time use surveys as described above. Hours worked in the market are the hours worked
for a wage plus commuting time.
We find that the household sector is big in most countries, but that its size varies rather
widely. Specifically, average weekly hours worked in household production are typically be-
tween 20 and 30 hours. This is a large share of average total hours worked in the household and
the market, which vary between 30 and 60 hours. To be precise, the 25th percentile is 42%, the
median is 45%, the average is 46%, and the 75th percentile is 49%.
A key finding of this paper is that household hours, market hours, and total hours do not
change much with GDP per capita. This feature of our data is consistent with the usual way
of calibrating the growth model that assumes that hours worked are constant along the BGP.
Focusing on household hours worked, we can see that while they decline somewhat as GDP
per capita increases from very low levels, for middle– and high–income countries they hardly
change when GDP per capita changes. Since effective taxes vary widely across countries, this
finding implies that there is no systematic relationship between hours worked in the household,
or in the market, and effective labor income taxes in our panel of 36 countries. Indeed, the
correlation coefficient between the two equals 0.02. The lack of a clear relationship between
hours worked in the household and effective labor income taxes generalizes what Duernecker
and Herrendorf (2015a) found for the U.S. and France, and it suggests that other forces like
difference in relative household productivity offset the effects of differences in taxes.9
Figure 1 features three notable outliers: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have much lower average
weekly household hours than the other countries. A key difference between these three coun-
tries and the rest of our sample is that men devote very little time to household production in
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. While every country shows a gender gap, with women performing
more hours of household production than men, the gender gap in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is
much starker: the ratio of male–to–female average household hours was 0.12 in Japan in 1996,
0.17 in Korea in 1995, and 0.1 in Taiwan in 1994. In comparison, that ratio is 0.62 in the U.S. in
1995; see Table 3 for more details and Huh and Yuh (2005) for more discussion. Since women
in these East Asian countries do not work more in the household than in other countries, the
lower household hours of men are not offset by higher household hours of woman, implying
that average hours worked in the household sector are much lower than in the other countries
of our sample.
The next natural question to ask is how the size of the household sector evolves relative
to the size of the market sector when economies develop and GDP per capita increases. We
divide the market sector into goods and service production. The rationale behind doing this is
that market–produced services are more substitutable with household production than market–
9See Rogerson (2008), Olovsson (2009), McDaniel (2011), and Ragan (2013) for studies of how taxes affect
hours worked in the household and the market.
7
Table 3: Weekly household hours for men and women in South–East Asia and the U.S.
year men women men/women
Japan 1996 3.2 26.4 0.12
Korea 1995 2.9 17.1 0.17
Taiwan 1994 2.6 25.3 0.10
U.S. 1995 17.6 28.3 0.62
produced goods. We take hours worked in the household and the market from time use surveys.
We split hours worked in the market between those producing goods and those producing ser-
vices by using information on the number of persons engaged in each of these two sectors. The
main data source in this context is the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) 10–
sector data base, which we supplement with KLEMS and the OECD if the GGDC 10–sector
data base does not have the required information. The market–service share in total hours is the
share of hours of Utilities; Trade, restaurants and hotels; Transport, storage and communica-
tion; Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; Government services; Community,
social and personal services in total value added. The market–goods share in total hours is one
minus the market–service share. An issue with that way of proceeding is that the time use data
is in hours whereas the numbers from the GGDC 10–sector data base are in persons engaged.
This is not a problem if relative hours per worker in the two sectors are similar across countries.
The upper panel of Figure 2 plots the hours in the household sector relative to the market–
service sector against GDP per capita (in 1990 prices, PPP converted from the Conference
Board). We can see that the hours of the household sector tend to fall relative to the market–
service sector when GDP per capita rises. As countries develop people substitute market–
produced services for household–produced services, which Freeman and Schettkat (2001) called
the marketization of services. We emphasize that the marketization of services comes through
clearly in our sample of rich and poor countries, which is considerably broader than the usual
ones.
Note that, again, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are outliers. This suggests that it would be
fruitful if future work devoted more detailed attention to studying their experiences, and perhaps
to those of other countries in East Asia.
2.3 Literature comparison and robustness
In this subsection, we compare our findings with those in the literature and establish that they
are robust to several different definitions of household production.
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Figure 2: Marketization of Services and Structural Transformation among Market Sectors
– Employment Shares
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Aguiar and Hurst (2007), Ramey (2009), and Ramey and Francis (2009) found that house-
hold hours fell in the 1960s as the U.S. got richer. This might seem at odds with our finding that
weekly hours of household production hardly change with GDP per capita for middle– and high
income countries. The last statement is particularly true since we essentially follow Ramey’s
choices of the time use categories that constitute household production. In Duernecker and Her-
rendorf (2015a), we used the same categorization as here and established that the differences
between our work and their work are due to two main differences. To begin with, the age groups
differ across the studies: in order to ensure comparability with the literature on cross–country
labor supply, we focus on the working–age population 15–64 years old whereas the other two
studies start later at 18 and 21 years. Second, as in Ramey and different from Aguiar–Hurst,
our numbers include students and retirees, they include childcare, and they do not control for
demographic change.
In what follows, we show that our conclusions do not change if we focus on the prime–age
population (25 to 54 years of age) and if we exclude childcare from household production (and
thereby assign it to leisure). We also provide results when we disaggregate into women and
men. This serves to show that even though there are rather large changes in household hours in
both groups, they largely offset each other. Figure 3 summarizes the findings of this exercise.
To facilitate comparison, we replot the average weekly hours of household production from
Figure 1. We can see that taking childcare out of household production has a downward level
effect and all but eliminates the mild negative relationship between weekly hours of household
production and GDP per capita for poor countries. Overall, the main stylized fact remains:
weekly hours of household production hardly change with GDP per capita. Focusing on prime
age workers (25–54 years old) has an upward level effect on weekly household hours while
leaving the overall pattern almost unchanged. Disaggregating into the average weekly hours
of men and women reveals rather large changes by subgroup: while women strongly decrease
their average weekly hours of household work when GDP per capita increases, men strongly
increase them. The net effect is that average weekly hours of household work hardly change.
The work of Fang and McDaniel (2014) is related to our work. These authors documented
the behavior of household hours in a panel of rich countries and found that in a given coun-
try household hours hardly change. Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz (2012) documented facts
about leisure for several countries from the 1970s to the 2000s and Juster and Stafford (1991),
Freeman and Schettkat (2001), Burda et al. (2008) and Ragan (2013) provided evidence from
limited cross sections. Our data cover considerably more observations than these papers. More-
over, these papers neither explored household production in the context of structural transfor-
mation nor did they attempt to estimate the value added and the labor productivity of household
production.
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Figure 3: Alternative Definitions of Household Employment
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2.4 Structural transformation
The conventional way of looking at structural transformation focuses on the reallocation of
resources within the market sector. The literature then finds that as GDP per capita increases,
the employment share of the goods–producing sector decreases whereas the employment share
of the service–producing sector increases. The lower panel of Figure 2 confirms that these
patterns also hold in our sample of countries. This suggests that there is nothing special about
our sample with regards to the structural transformation within the market sector, which is
reassuring to know for what follows.
The conventional way of looking at structural transformation does not address what happens
if one adopts a broader notion of sectors as comprising economic activity both in the market
and the household. Adopting this broader notion presents at least two challenges. The first
one is that information about the household sector is not as readily available as information
about the market sectors. By collecting time use data about hours worked in the household
for 36 countries, we have been able to overcome the first challenge. Nonetheless we still face
a second challenge that we have little systematic information about the composition of the
value added produced in the household. For now, we make the usual assumption that all value
added produced in the household takes the form of services, implying that the service sector
comprises both market– and household–produced services whereas the goods sector comprises
just market–produced goods. This assumption is motivated by the common view that services
are the most important component of value added produced in the household, at least in rich
countries. Below we will discuss the implications of allowing goods to be produced also in the
household, which is of some importance in poorer countries.
Figure 4 reports the employment shares relative to total hours worked both in the market
and the household. As GDP per capita increases, the employment share of the household sector
remains roughly unchanged while the employment share of the goods sector decreases and the
employment share of the market–services sector increases. That the employment share of the
household sector remains roughly unchanged must mean that the opposing effects of structural
transformation and marketization on household hours largely cancel each other, leaving no clear
correlation between GDP per capita and hours worked in the household sector. The decline
in the employment share of the goods sector implies that the employment share of the broad
service sector, which comprises market and household services, increases. In other words, the
usual patterns of structural transformation still hold for market goods and broad services, which
comprise both market– and household–produced services.
In poor countries part of household production falls into the goods sector, because house-
holds also produce clothes, food, furniture, etc. Instead, we have attributed all household pro-
duction to the service sector. This oversimplification is not likely to invalidate the qualitative
patterns of structural transformation that we have identified though. The reason for this is that
12
Figure 4: Structural Transformation among Household and Market Sectors
– Employment Shares in Total Time
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only in poor countries a non–negligible part of household production falls into the goods sec-
tor. That implies that all we have abstracted from is an additional structural transformation
from goods to services that takes place within the household sector. If anything, taking this ad-
ditional structural transformation into account intensifies the overall structural transformation
from goods to services that we obtained under our crude assumption that household produce
only services.
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3 Value Added and Labor Productivity of Household Pro-
duction
3.1 Data and Methodology
So far we have looked at the main input into household production, hours worked. A different
way of describing the economic activity of the household sector is to look at what it produces.
This presents a new challenge because the value added of household production is not traded
in the market and, therefore, is not part of NIPA.10 One way of dealing with this challenge is
to impute the value added produced in the household. For our imputation, we use the income
method of calculating value added, which combines information about the use of the production
factors with market rental prices for comparable production factors. Specifically, value added of
household production equals the sum of capital and labor used in the household each multiplied
with an appropriate market rental price:
Yht = (rt + δ)K
h
t + wtH
h
t (1)
where Yh denotes value added produced by the household, r denotes the real interest rate in the
market, δ denotes the depreciation rate, Kh denotes capital used in the household, w denotes
an appropriate market wage, and Lh denotes hours worked in the household. Note that as
usual the rental price of capital is the sum of the real interest rate and the deprecation rate.
Kendrick (1979), Landefeld et al. (2009) and Bridgman (2013) offer detailed descriptions of
this methodology and Schreyer and Diewert (2014) provide a theoretical justification for it.
Our contribution here is to come up with comparable estimates according to this methodology
for a large sample of 33 countries.11
We define capital used for household production as the stock of consumer durables. We
choose to include all consumer durables, not just household appliances, in household capi-
tal because many capital goods that are used in household production are part of consumer
durables but not of household appliances. Examples include equipment for gardening, tools
for maintenance, cars etc. There are also consumer durables that are not used for household
production, for example, audio equipment, sporting equipment, televisions etc. Including them
overestimates the stock of household capital. Since the share of household capital in household
value added is rather small, this is not of first–order importance in our context though. Some
authors include part of residential housing in household capital; see for example Bridgman
(2013). We have not done that here for at least two reasons. First, the imputed services from
10An exception to this statement is the imputed value added for owner–occupied housing, which is included in
GDP.
11Our approach and that of Bridgman (2013) are generally the same. The main difference is that we selected a
method we could implement in a wide variety of counties which was not a concern for his work.
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Figure 5: Market and Total Production per capita
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residential housing are already included in NIPA value added, so including them in household
value added would require us to change all market numbers. Second, it is even less clear than
with consumer durables which part of residential housing is an input into household production
and which part is an input into leisure (or personal care and sleep). This only impacts the home
productivity numbers, though Bridgman (2013) shows that the time series is not significantly
changed if residential capital is excluded.
To calculate the stock of capital used for household production, we obtain investment as
the sum of the final expenditure on consumer durables in constant prices from NIPA and then
use the perpetual inventory method. We convert capital in constant prices into capital in current
prices by using the price index of investment in consumer durables in the current period. We use
the ten–year rates of return on government bonds plus the depreciation rate as the rental price
for household capital. This is slightly different from Bridgman (2013), who uses the BEAs
estimates of household financial asset returns and consumer durables stocks.
Above we already calculated hours worked in the household, so we only need an appropri-
ate factor price from the market to value hours worked in household production. We use the
average hourly compensation of market workers that are hired by the private–households sector
as reported in NIPA. To calculate real labor productivity of household production, we translate
nominal value added into constant–price, constant–PPP value added by using the OECD price
indexes for expenditure on close market substitutes to household consumption. Section 4 below
reports several robustness checks that suggest that in the U.S. this method works well.
To appreciate what the imputation of the value added of labor entails, it may be useful to
recall the NAICS definition of this sub–sector: “Industries in the Private Households subsector
include private households that engage in employing workers on or about the premises in ac-
tivities primarily concerned with the operation of the household. These private households may
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employ individuals, such as cooks, maids, and butlers, and outside workers, such as gardeners,
caretakers, and other maintenance workers.” To avoid confusion, we stress that these hired
workers receive wages, and so the value added they produce is part of the value added of the
market sector and an intermediate input into the household sector.
To compute the sectoral value added shares of market production, we again use sectoral
information from the GGDC 10–Sector Data Base, appropriately complemented by data from
KLEMS and OECD data if required. The market–service share in total value added is the share
in current local prices of the value added of Utilities; Trade, restaurants and hotels; Transport,
storage and communication; Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; Government
services; Community, social and personal services in total value added. The market–goods
share in total value added is one minus the market–service share.
3.2 Market versus total production per capita
To get a sense of how large household produced value added is, Figure 5 list the 2005–2010
averages of market production per capita versus total production per capita (i.e., GDP versus
GDP plus household value added per capita in constant 2005 international dollars). We can
see that including household value added in production considerably increases the production
in all countries. Moreover, in line with an often heard argument, including household value
added in production both mitigate the inequality across countries and changes the ranking of
countries: the difference in production per capita shrinks from a factor of 18.4 to 11.9; there
is some notable reshuffling of countries, with Germany gaining and Japan and Korea losing
several places, and switching ranks as a result.
3.3 Marketization and structural transformation in terms of value added
Figures 6 and 7 show that qualitatively, the patterns for employment shares reported above
also hold for value added shares, with the exception that the value added shares of household
production are now too noisy to see clear patterns. Otherwise, as GDP per capita increases, the
value added produced in the goods sectors declines as a share of the market value added and as
a share of the total value added while the value added produced in the service sectors increases
as a share both of market value added and total value added.
3.4 Labor productivity
Given that we have estimated both the value added and the hours worked in household produc-
tion, it is straightforward to produce estimates for the labor productivity of the household sector.
Figure 8 shows the results. The upper left panel shows that in the U.S., the labor productivity
16
Figure 6: Marketization of Services and Structural Transformation among Market Sectors
– Value–added Shares
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Figure 7: Structural Transformation among Household and Market sectors
– Value–added Shares in Total Value Added
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Figure 8: Labor productivity of household production
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of household production has all but stagnated since 1960. This figure also plots the experi-
ence of the other countries in which the labor productivity of household production has mostly
stagnated, namely Australia, Austria, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, and Spain. The
upper right panel plots the remaining countries, in which the labor productivity of household
production has caught up, or even overtaken, that of the U.S..
The lower panel of Figure 8 shows that while the labor productivity in household production
is positively correlated which labor productivity in market production, the household sector
tends to be considerably less productive than the market sector. In particular, our estimates of
the labor productivity of the household sector rarely exceed one half of the labor productivity
of the market sector, and often they remain below that.
Estimates of the labor productivity of household production are helpful when one seeks to
connect models with a household sector to the data. This statement applies to both estimations
like Fang and Zhu (2012) and Moro et al. (2015) and to calibrations like Ngai and Pissarides
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(2008), Rogerson (2008), and McDaniel (2011). Calibrations of the growth model with house-
hold production deliver that household productivity stagnates in the U.S., which is also what
our imputation implies. The typical approach in the literature then is to postulate that the ra-
tio of the labor productivities in the household relative to the market shows the same behavior
around the world as in the U.S.; see for example Rogerson (2008) or McDaniel (2011). We
find that this is born out of the data only for a minority of countries in our sample. In contrast,
in most other countries the labor productivity of household production experienced sustained
increases, and it often caught up with or even overtook that in the U.S.
4 Robustness of the Labor Imputation
Quantitatively, a key input into our imputation of the value added of household production is
the wage of household workers. The reason for this is that labor has a much larger share in
household production than capital. In this section, we discuss issues related to the robustness
of imputing the value of the labor input into household production.
4.1 Opportunity cost approach
Instead of using the wages of workers in the private–households sector, we could have used
the market wages of all workers as the rental price of hours worked in the household. This
might seem more appealing at first sight because it captures the opportunity costs of working
in the household instead of working in the market. Nonetheless, it is not appropriate to use
the opportunity cost approach here, because it would imply that the productivity of working in
the household is determined by a person’s productivity of working in the market. This would
mean, for example, that doctors have higher productivities when working in the household than
professional household workers. Schreyer and Diewert (2014) argued that this is implausible.
Estimating a life–cycle model with household production, House et al. (2008) found evidence
that supports the view of Schreyer and Diewert: for each dollar women earned in the market,
they gave up only 28 cents worth of household production. This suggests that the average
market wage is not the appropriate rental price for household production time.
4.2 Wages in the U.S. Household Sector
In this subsection, we provide additional evidence that a specialized household worker is not
likely to be much more productive in performing household work than a private individual,
in which case it is a reasonable first pass to use the average wage of household workers as a
proxy for the return to an individual’s labor input in household production. To establish this,
we will document that there is a low degree of wage dispersion in the U.S. household sector
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compared to the aggregate economy. This evidence suggests that the productivity differences
of workers employed in the household sector are small and that there is only a limited role for
the accumulation of occupation–specific human capital in the household sector.
We use data from the CPS (accessed via IPUMS CPS) for the period 1994–2013 to analyse
in more detail the behavior of wages in the U.S. household sector in comparison with the ag-
gregate economy.12 The upper–left panel in Figure 9 plots the percentiles of the hourly wage
distribution in 2005 for the household sector and the aggregate economy. We can see that
wages in the household sector are less dispersed and more closely centered around the median
wage. For example, the difference between the 75th and the 25th percentile is about $3 for the
household sector in contrast to $8 for the aggregate economy, and the difference between the
90th and the 10th percentile is $7 vs $16. The upper–right panel plots the deviation of each
percentile from the median wage. To address the question whether this is a robust observation
or we cherry picked 2005, the two lower panels show the 90th–to–10th and the 75th–to–25th
difference for the period from 1994 to 2013. The relatively low degree of wage dispersion in
the household sector is a very stable phenomenon during the 1990s and 2000s.
As a robustness check, we compute the labor productivity of the household sector with the
25th and the 75th percentile wage instead of the average wage. The results are depicted in
Figure 10. We find that the use of the lower– and upper–wage percentiles leads only to a minor
shift in the level of productivity. The evolution over time is largely unaltered. The finding
reflect the facts that the wage distribution for household sector wages is compressed around the
mean and stable over time.
4.3 Disaggregate occupations and household production
Next, we compute the labor input to household production as the sum of more disaggregate
activities. Specifically, instead of imputing household value added as before in (1), we use the
more elaborate approach:
Yht = (rt + δ)K
h
t +
∑
i
witHhit (2)
where Hhi is the time spent on household production activity i and wi is the average market wage
in the occupation which is associated with activity i. The reason for doing this is to avoid a
mismatch between the average wage and household production activities that occurs when the
distribution of the employment share of occupations in the household sector differs from the
distribution of hours worked over time use activities in household production. To be concrete,
12We face the usual problem that wages in the CPS are top–coded. Since this is more likely to be relevant for
market workers than for household workers, the estimated gaps between market and household wages are likely to
be somewhat downward biased.
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Figure 9: Wages in the total economy and the household sector
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Figure 10: Labor productivity for different assumptions about rental price of labor
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suppose that 90% of household–sector employment is child care workers and 10% is cooks
but 10% of total household hours is spent on cooking and 90% is spent on childcare. In this
admittedly extreme example, the use of the average household sector wage would not properly
reflect the factor return to labor (especially if there was a large wage differential between cooks
and nannies).
We apply the following multi–step procedure to compute
∑
i witHhit:
Step 1: determine the occupations that account for the major part of employment in the household
sector;
Step 2: use time–use data to compute the average hours of work for broad categories of household
production activities;
Step 3: match the occupations from step 1 to the activities from step 2;
Step 4: compute the average market wage for each activity/occupation group.
Step 1 (major occupations in the U.S. household sector): We identify the seven occu-
pations in the U.S. household sector with the largest employment shares. Table 4 shows for
1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 the employment shares of all occupations that are employed by the
household sector.
Table 4: Employment shares of the seven major occupations in U.S. private household sector
1995 2000 2005 2010
Cleaners and servants (405,407) 41.1 49.0 48.7 50.7
Child care workers (468) 39.7 34.8 32.2 29.1
Nursing aides, orderlies, attendants (447) 8.7 7.9 13.7 12.2
Gardeners and groundskeepers (486) 2.4 3.5 1.3 1.5
Laborers outside construction (889) 1.1 0.5 1.2 2.2
Cooks (436) 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.0
Janitors (453) 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.7
Numbers in brackets are CPS occupation codes.
Source: CPS, accessed via IPUMS CPS
Step 2 (time use and activities in household production): Next, we decompose the total
household production time and compute how much time an average American spends on each
sub–category of household production. The results for selected years are in Table 5. Table 6
shows how the different activity categories are aggregated into the broad activity groups.
Step 3 (matching time–use activities and occupations): Table 7 shows how each of the
major household sector occupations is assigned to one of the household production activities.
Step 4 (wages in household–sector occupations): Next, we compute average wages for
each broad household sector occupation group. Table 8 has the results. It also shows the average
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Table 5: Time used in household production activities in the U.S.
1995 2000 2005 2010
Cleaning 5.2 5.0 5.2 4.8
Childcare 2.8 3.9 4.9 4.7
Adultcare 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.1
Cooking 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7
Repair 3.0 2.5 2.1 1.9
Gardening 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.1
Shopping 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.5
Average weekly hours. Source: AHTUS
Table 6: Aggregation of household production activities
Cleaning Cooking
1 cleaning 15 food preparation, cooking
2 laundry, ironing, clothing repair 16 set table, wash/put away dishes
3 pet care, walk dogs Repair
Childcare 17 household care
4 care of infants 18 home repairs, maintain vehicle
5 general care of older children 19 other domestic work
6 medical care of children Gardening
7 play with children 20 gardening
8 supervise child or help with homework Shopping
9 read to, talk with child 21 purchase routine goods
10 other child care 22 purchase consumer durables
11 travel related to child care 23 purchase personal services
Adultcare 24 purchase medical services
12 adult care 25 purchase repair, laundry services
13 personal medical care 26 purchase financial/government services
14 personal or adult care travel 27 purchase other services
28 travel related to consumption
Table 7: Matching time–use activities and occupations
Cleaning, Shopping Cleaners and servants (405,407)
Childcare Child care workers (468)
Adultcare Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants (447)
Cooking Cooks (436)
Gardening, Repair Gardeners and groundskeepers (486)
Laborers outside construction (889)
Janitors (453)
wage in the total economy for the same occupation groups. We can see that while there is some
variation, the variation is relatively small.
Now we have all the ingredients to impute household sector value added according to the
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Table 8: Average hourly wages (in current $): private household sector and total market sector
1995 2000 2005 2010
Household sector
Cleaners and servants 7.1 8.0 9.5 10.2
Child care workers 4.6 6.7 8.4 9.8
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 8.4 8.4 9.4 11.7
Cooks 6.1 10.0 10.3 -
Gardeners and groundskeepers, Laborers outside construction, Janitors 7.3 8.0 11.5 11.7
Total economy
Cleaners and servants 6.7 7.9 9.1 10.2
Child care workers 5.5 7.6 8.7 10.1
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 7.6 8.9 9.8 11.1
Cooks 6.2 7.7 9.1 10.3
Gardeners and groundskeepers, Laborers outside construction, Janitors 7.8 9.2 10.8 11.9
disaggregate method described in equation (2). The results are in Figure 11 below. The solid
blue line represents the benchmark case in which we use the average wage of household work-
ers. The broken red line represents the case in which we distinguish between occupations and
use disaggregate average wages for these occupations. The dotted–dashed black line is like the
red one except we now use averages wages in the total economy for the household occupations.
We can see that the differences among these cases are negligible, suggesting that compositional
issues are not of first–order importance for our imputation of value added produced by hours
worked in the household.
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5 Conclusion
We have provided new evidence on household production in 36 countries since 1960. We have
found that the household sector is big, accounting for on average 46% of total hours worked.
As GDP increases, the employment share of household production in total hours worked ini-
tially declines somewhat and then hardly changes while the employment share of market goods
decreases and the employment share of market services increases. We have computed the value
added of household production and have confirmed that these patterns still hold, although it is
surrounded by much more noise. We have found that labor productivity of household produc-
tion is positively correlated with and lower than labor productivity in the market. Lastly, while
the labor productivity of household production stagnated in the U.S., it caught up with the U.S.
level in most other countries.
These findings are a useful input for calibrating models with household production. We
hope that future work will broaden the panel of countries for which we were able to obtain
data. As more time–use surveys and more data for household capital become available, it should
become feasible to make more robust statements about middle–income and poor countries. This
should be useful in assessing whether the patterns established here hold more generally.
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Appendix
Data source
The Tables 9–10 list all countries for which we have information on household production time.
For each country, the tables report (i) the year with the time use information, (ii) whether or not
we use microdata to compute household production time, (iii) the data source and (iv) [for the
web–sources] the access date.
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Table 9: Datasource for information on time use
Country Year Data source and date of access
Albania 2010 Republic of Albania, Institute of Statistics: Time Use Survey, 2010–2011. Available at: www.instat.gov.
al/media/171100/albanian_time_use_survey_2010-2011.pdf. Accessed: 10/2/2014.
Algeria 2012 Office National des Statistiques: Enquete sur l’emploi du temps enet Algerie 2012. Available at: www.ons.
dz/IMG/pdf/RAPPORT_ENET_2012_FRAN_2_.pdf. Accessed: 9/15/2014.
Australia 1974* Australian Data Archive: Australians’ Use of Time, Albury–Wodonga and Melbourne, 1974.
1992
Australian Bureau of Statistics: How Australians Use Their Time, 1992. Available at:
www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/20B53461F3AA25F2CA25722500049576/
$File/41530_1992.pdf. Accessed: 9/9/2014.
1997
Australian Bureau of Statistics: How Australians Use Their Time, 1997. Available at: www.ausstats.
abs.gov.au/Ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/CA25687100069892CA256889001D5545/$File/
41530_1997.pdf. Accessed: 9/9/2014.
2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics: How Australians Use Their Time, 2006. Available at: www.abs.gov.au/
AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/4153.02006?OpenDocument. Accessed: 9/9/2014.
Austria 1981, 1992
O¨sterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt: Zeitverwendung 1992/1981. Available at: http:
//www.statistik.at/web_de/static/zeitverwendung_19921981_--_ergebnisse_des_
mikrozensus__069150.pdf. Accessed: 8/21/2014.
2008* STATISTIK AUSTRIA: Zeitverwendungserhebung 2008/09
(erstellt im Auftrag der Bundesministerin fu¨r Frauen und O¨ffentlichen Dienst).
Bangladesh 2012* Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: Time Use Pilot Survey 2012
Basque Country 1992*, 1997*,2002*, 2008* Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
Canada 1971*, 1981 Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
1986*, 1992*,
1998*, 2005*,
2010*
Statistics Canada: General Social Survey, Cycle 2,7,12,19,24. This analysis is based on the Statistics
Canada General Social Survey, Time Use Cycle 2, 7, 12, 19, 24. Reference Year: 1986, 1992, 1998, 2005,
2010. All computations, use and interpretation of these data are entirely that of Georg Duernecker.
Colombia 2012* Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadstica: Encuesta Nacional de Uso del Tiempo – ENUT–
2012 – 2013.
Denmark 1964* Danish Data Archives: Danish National Study of Leisure 1964.
1975* Danish Data Archives: Fritidsundersøgelsen 1975.
1987* Danish Data Archives: Befolkningens tidsanvendelse 1987.
2001* SFI – The Danish National Centre for Social Research: The Danish Time Use Survey.
Ecuador 2012* Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos: Encuesta Especfica de Uso del Tiempo, EUT 2012.
Estonia 2000, 2010 Statistics Estonia. Available at: http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/I_Databas/Social_Life/
17TIME_USE/17TIME_USE.asp. Accessed: 10/1/2014.
Finland 1979 Printed report provided by Statistics Finland.
1987, 1999,
2009
Statistics Finland: Time Use Survey. Available at: http://193.166.171.75/Database/StatFin/eli/
akay/akay_en.asp. Accessed: 9/4/2014.
France 1965*, 1974*,
1998*
Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
1985
Les Rythmes Quotidiens en France; Re´sultats de l’enqueˆte ”Emplois du temps” 1985–1986. Available at:
Bibliothe´que de l’Insee, 18 Boulevard Adolphe Pinard, 75014 Paris, France.
2010 Enqueˆte Emploi du temps 2009–2010. Available at: http://www.insee.fr/fr/
publications-et-services/irweb.asp?id=edt2010. Accessed: 8/20/2014.
Germany 1965*, 1991*,
2001*
Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
Hungary 2010* Hungarian Central Statistical Office: Time survey 2010
India 1998* Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation: Time Use Survey for India, 1998
Iraq 2007* Iraq Household Socio–Economic Survey 2007
Italy 1979*, 1989* Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
2002*, 2009* ISTAT Uso del tempo 2002/03 and Uso del tempo 2008/09
Japan 1976, 1981,
1986, 1991
Statistics Japan: Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities. Available at: http://www.stat.go.jp/
english/data/shakai/2001/jikei.htm. Accessed: 8/19/2014.
1996, 2001,
2006, 2011
Statistics Japan: Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities. Available at: http://www.stat.go.jp/
english/data/shakai/index.htm. Accessed: 8/19/2014
Korea
1981, 1985,
1990, 1995,
2000, 2005,
2010
Korean Broadcasting System and Institute for Communications Research at Seoul National University.
Macedonia 2009 Republic of Macedonia, State Statistical Office: Time Use Survey, 2009. Available at: http://www.stat.
gov.mk/Publikacii/2.4.11.01.pdf. Accessed: 10/2/2014.
Mexico 2002*, 2009* INEGI: Encuesta Nacional sobre Uso del Tiempo 2002 and Encuesta Nacional sobre Uso del Tiempo 2009.
Netherlands
1975*, 1980*,
1985*, 1990*,
1995*, 2000*,
2005*
Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
The years with a * are those for which we use micro time–use data to compute the household production time. For the years without a *, we do
not have access to microdata and we use instead pre–aggregated data that is obtained from the source listed in the respective entry.
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Table 10: Datasource for information on time use, cont’d
Country Year Data source and date of access
New Zealand 1998, 2009 Statistics New Zealand: Time Use Surveys 1999 and 2009/10. Available at: http://www.stats.govt.
nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/time_use.aspx. Accessed: 9/2/2014
Norway
1970, 1980,
1990, 2000,
2010
Statistics Norway. Available at: http://www.ssb.no/tidsbruk/ and https://www.ssb.
no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp?KortNavnWeb=tidsbruk&
CMSSubjectArea=kultur-og-fritid&PLanguage=1&checked=true. Accessed: 9/2/2014.
Panama 2011
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censo: La Encuesta de Uso del Tiempo. Available at: http:
//www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/publicaciones/Publicaciones.aspx?ID_SUBCATEGORIA=
63&ID_PUBLICACION=515&ID_IDIOMA=1. Accessed: 7/29/2015.
Poland 2003* Central Statistical Office: Time Use Survey 2003–2004.
Russia
1993*-1996*,
1998*, 2006*-
2009*
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey – Higher School of Education. We thank the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE, conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Eco-
nomics and ZAO “Demoscope” together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS for making these data available.
Slovenia 2000* Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia: Time use Survey 2001.
South Africa 2000*, 2010* Statistics South Africa: Time Use Survey 2000 and Time Use Survey 2010.
Spain 2003*, 2009* Istituto Nacional de Estadı´stica: Encuesta de Empleo del Tiempo 2002–2003. Available at: http://www.
ine.es/en/prodyser/micro_emptiem_en.htm. Accessed: 9/2/2014.
Sweden 1984* Swedish National Data Service: HUS 1984.
1990 Statistics Sweden. Available at: http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/LE0103_
1990I91_BR_LE79SA9201.pdf. Accessed: 9/15/2014.
2000 Statistics Sweden. Available at: http://www.scb.se/statistik/le/le0103/2003m00/
le99sa0301.pdf. Accessed: 9/15/2014.
2010 Statistics Sweden. Available at: http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/LE0103_
2010A01_BR_LE123BR1201.pdf. Accessed: 9/15/2014.
Taiwan 1987*, 1990*,
1994*
Directorate–General of Budget,Accounting and Statistics,Central Taiwan Division: Time Utilization Sur-
veys 1987, 1990, 1994.
U.K.
1961*, 1974*,
1983*, 1987*,
1995*, 2000*,
2005*
Centre for Time Use Research: Multinational Time Use Studies
Uruguay 2007* Instituto National de Estadistica: Encuesta continua de hogares, Uso del tiempo y trabajo no remunerado.
U.S.
1965*, 1975*,
1985*, 1992*,
2003*–2012*
Centre for Time Use Research: American Heritage Time Use Study
The years with a * are those for which we use micro time–use data to compute the household production time. For the years without a *, we do
not have access to microdata and we use instead pre–aggregated data that is obtained from the source listed in the respective entry.
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